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Commentary
Charles I. Plosser
One of the themes of Bill’s work was the
importance of uncertainty for monetary policy.
One dimension of uncertainty involves our uncer-
tainty regarding the nature of the macroeconomic
model that governs the economy. In Poole (1971),
Bill investigated the performance of simple “rules
of thumb” for setting the federal funds rate. He
argued that these simple rules appeared to be
“robust” across various model specifications.
This line of research has become increasingly
active and has some important things to say about
the conduct of monetary policy. I find the analysis
of simple rules intriguing for a couple of reasons.
First and foremost, they are rules. Second, in a
framework where policy is decided by committee,
simple rules that are robust across models provide
a valuable focal point for discussion among people
with different world views.
Bill’s primary concern dealt with uncertainty
in a given model, but he also discussed how opti-
mal policy would vary when model parameters
changed. Thus, his concern reflected a desire to
analyze optimal policy under model uncertainty.
As I indicated, this area of research has seen a
resurgence in recent years, with various method-
ologies ranging from robust control to Bayesian
model averaging being employed to analyze opti-
mal policy under uncertainty. Perhaps even more
interesting is the research that considers the
robustness of simple rules across models that are
non-nested and thus potentially very different.1
I
t is indeed a pleasure to have the oppor-
tunity to be here today at the Thirty-Second
Annual Economic Policy Conference of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. It
is a conference I have attended a dozen times
or more in various roles. In each and every case,
it has proven to be a timely and thoughtful
interchange among academic economists and
policymakers.
I am particularly pleased to be participating
this year, since this is the last of these conferences
that will be held during Bill Poole’s tenure as
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
I have had the privilege of knowing Bill for at
least 25 years, perhaps more. I am sure that many
of you in the room can also make similar claims.
Over the years I have learned a great deal from
Bill. His seminal contributions in the area of
monetary theory and policy are widespread and
span four decades. Whether it be his contributions
on monetary policy under uncertainty, his early
investigations of simple rules for setting the fed-
eral funds rate, or his analysis of rational expecta-
tions models of the term structure for monetary
policy, his theoretical contributions provided
fundamental insights and played an important
role in developing what we now view as the core
of modern monetary theory. He has continued
his contributions to monetary policy as a member
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
bringing the same sound, thoughtful, and consis-
tent economic analysis to policy deliberations.
1 McCallum (1988) was one of the first to investigate the robustness
properties of simple rules.
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Orphanides and Wieland (2008) paper, which I
found very interesting, I would like to backtrack
and talk about why I believe explorations of rules
of thumb are important and what we know about
their performance.
As I stated at the outset, one of the greatest
attractions of simple rules is that they are in fact
rules. Since the pioneering work of Kydland and
Prescott (1977), we have come to understand the
theoretical foundations for the importance of
commitment by policymakers.
One way that commitment manifests itself is
that, in model economies, the optimal monetary
policy typically takes the form of a rule. In these
models the researcher looks for policies that
deliver efficient allocations, that is, the allocations
that would be selected by a Ramsey planner. In
this context, optimal policy need not be simple,
but it does need to be a rule.
However, the Fed does not pick allocations
like the Ramsey planner—its picks an instrument
and moves that instrument to influence economic
outcomes. Thus, there are important issues regard-
ing the implementation of policy that must be
considered, and this is where I believe that simple
policy rules have a role to play.
The question then is, why might we choose
to adopt simple rules? If everyone had the same
model of the economy, there would be no reason
to do so. So the underlying attraction of investigat-
ing simple rules is twofold. First, everyone may
not agree on a common model. Thus, optimal
policy for one policymaker may not be optimal
for another. Second, even if there is an agreed-
upon model, the economy is likely to be more
complicated than the model, so the optimal policy
for that model may not be the optimal policy for
the true underlying economy.
So it seems natural to ask if there are simple
rules that capture the essence of optimal rules
and that give good results in a variety of theoreti-
cal environments. In other words, how different
are the allocations under simple rules from those
obtained under optimal policy? How costly is a
simple rule?
A number of researchers have analyzed the
performance of simple rules. One interesting
approach is that by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2006). The underlying model is quite rich, incor-
porating price stickiness, investment adjustment
costs, habit persistence, variable capacity utiliza-
tion, and monopolistic competition. The model
considers three types of shocks: policy shocks,
total factor productivity shocks, and investment-
specific technology shocks.
They find that a simple Taylor-like rule that
responds aggressively to inflation, wage growth,
and very little to deviations of output growth from
target comes very close to achieving the optimal
allocations. In fact, a rule that responds solely to
price inflation yields good results in this model.
The basic message here is that, in a model with
large non-neutralities, but primarily forward-
looking agents, a simple Taylor-like rule comes
fairly close to implementing Ramsey allocations.
Perhaps surprisingly, the properties of the rule
place significant weight on an aggressive response
to deviations of inflation from target.
Although the model of Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe does a fairly good job of matching the data,
it may not be the only model to do so. Other
policymakers or researchers may wish to stress
different model features. For example, I may not
be as keen on models with the degree of price
stickiness or as comfortable with the adjustment
costs and habit formation built into the model, but
I do place a lot of stock in models with forward-
looking rational agents. So it is of some interest
and importance to question whether these intrigu-
ing results are robust to perturbations in the
model not considered by the authors. Basically,
we want to know how robust these findings are
to models that accommodate very different views
of behavior, models that perhaps fit the data as
well as the one Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe consider.
The question of robustness has been addressed
in a number of ways. The most common strategy
is to look at the performance of simple rules in a
host of different, sometimes non-nested models.
In these exercises, the most interesting questions
in my mind are these: How similar are the optimal
rules from different models? And are there simple
rules that work well across models?
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999 and
2003) have explored the performance of various
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characterize the optimal simple rule for each
model and find that there are broad similarities
that describe the best simple rule. In some cases
they find the best simple rule that minimizes the
average loss across models. In their 2003 article,
this rule responds to smoothed inflation forecasts
at most one-year ahead, current inflation, lagged
interest rates, and, unlike the Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe analysis, in a significant way to the output
gap. In part, this distinction is driven by differ-
ences in the loss functions. One feature of the
robust rule is that it exhibits inertia in that the
coefficient on the lagged interest rate is close to 1.
This is in contrast to the results found in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, where inertia was not important.
Besides uncertainty resulting from stochastic
factors or from not knowing the true model,
policymakers and the public may be unaware of
the true processes governing the stochastic ele-
ments of the model.
Orphanides and Williams (2002 and 2007),
for example, examine the usefulness of simple
rules when the processes for the natural rate of
interest and employment are unobserved and not
known. Further, agents form forecasts of relevant
macroeconomic variables using a learning method-
ology. The learning mechanism along with persis-
tent errors in estimating natural rates yields highly
nonlinear behavior and implies significant depar-
tures from the rational expectations equilibrium.
An important feature of this model is that there
is the possibility that expectations of inflation can
become unanchored. The main lesson I take away
from their analysis is that, even in this environ-
ment, simple rules can work quite well, but those
rules should be based on rates of change in out-
put or employment. This avoids the notoriously
difficult problems associated with estimating
natural rates of output or unemployment.
These analyses indicate that in the presence
of very different types of uncertainty—stochastic
disturbances, uncertainty about the correct model,
and uncertainty about the nature of true driving
processes—simple rules for monetary policy are
able to deliver good economic outcomes.
To many observers it comes as somewhat of a
surprise that simple rules should do as well as
they do. The reason they do is not obvious. It is
hard to know whether some form of Occam’s
razor is at work or something else. This is some-
what uncomfortable from a theoretical perspec-
tive, yet I find the analyses to date convincing
and useful from the perspective and experience
of a policymaker and economist.
Given that simple rules appear to have desir-
able properties in terms of delivering good out-
comes in a variety of theoretical settings, I think
they have other desirable characteristics that
suggest they are of value to policymakers.
First, policy guided by simple rules is easy
to monitor and to communicate. Transparency is
an important attribute of good monetary policy.
In a world where expectations of the future play
a critical role in economic outcomes, the trans-
parency and predictability/credibility of mone-
tary policy can reduce expectational errors and
contribute to a more stable economic environ-
ment. Using simple rules, which can be easily
communicated to the public, as benchmarks or
guidelines can enhance both transparency and
credibility of policy.
I believe that there is another benefit from
using simple rules as a guide for policy. Specifi-
cally, I believe that simple rules serve as a useful
focal point in policy deliberations. The underlying
models employed by various FOMC members can
be quite different and, in some cases, may not
even share the same set of state variables. Thus,
deliberating the implications of various policy
options or the workings of the economy can be
quite complicated. Indeed, as I previously dis-
cussed, the optimal rule, even from a well-
articulated model, can be quite complex and
quite different across models. If the underlying
model is not well articulated or completely speci-
fied, then we may not even know what the optimal
or best rule might be. Thus, trying to reach a con-
sensus on appropriate policy can be difficult.
By focusing on simple rules, deliberations
can focus on a few key variables and our assump-
tions or forecasts that shape them. It also leads to
a more focused discussion of the shape and param-
eters of the loss functions that may be applicable.
I believe this would greatly improve policy delib-
erations by directing attention to the key factors
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benefits arise only if the simple rules have some
good robustness properties associated with them.
As I have indicated, my reading of the literature
to date makes me optimistic that this is indeed
the case.
Finally, let me turn my attention to the
Orphanides and Wieland (2008) paper. How does
their paper fit into this broader literature? First,
the investigation is a positive analysis rather than
a normative one. That is, they seek to study and
uncover the characteristics of FOMC decisions
over the past 20 years in the context of a simple
rule.
The rules investigated are simple and, impor-
tantly, are based on the real-time information
that policymakers actually possess at the time
decisions are made. The rule that seems to explain
Fed behavior the best is a forward-looking rule
that responds aggressively to deviations of infla-
tion from target. In this regard, Fed behavior
seems in accord with the guidance of robust rules.
If anything, the response seems more aggressive
than is sometimes indicated by the more theoreti-
cal investigations.
The Fed also appears to respond to forecasts
of unemployment and its deviations from some
natural rate. The authors do not directly estimate
a natural rate of unemployment; they allow it to
be subsumed in the constant term. This strategy
may or may not be a good one. Indeed, some of
Orphanides’s own work suggests that looking at
growth rate rules might be a better practice, and
it would have been interesting to see how they
would have stacked up in this comparison. Of
course, this might not make too much difference
over this period if there was not much movement
in the natural rate.
Another interesting feature of the results is
that the degree of inertia is markedly less when
the rules are assumed to be forward looking, that
is, based on forecasts, than when they are based
on outcomes. The robust rules prescribed in
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999 and 2003)
or Orphanides and Williams (2007) suggest that
policy should be more inertial. What might be
the reasons for this finding? One possibility is
that the robustness results may be relying too
heavily on learning and the world may be more
rational and forward looking than the models
presume.
Probably one of the more interesting findings
in the paper concerns the shifting focus of the
Fed’s preferred inflation measure. The puzzle is
that, as the Fed shifted its emphasis from the con-
sumer price index to the core personal consump-
tion expenditures, it apparently did not change
the parameters of the estimated rule. This is a
puzzle because the personal consumption expen-
ditures measure generally is about 50 basis points
below the consumer price index, on average. Thus,
changing the inflation measure allowed the Fed
to maintain a lower funds rate for a given rate of
inflation. I will not speculate on why this is the
case. But it does suggest that policy was not as
committed to a policy rule as the regression esti-
mates seem to suggest.
Overall, I found the paper interesting and
useful in furthering our understanding of simple
rules. It points to some unresolved issues, partic-
ularly those that pertain to the ability to describe
actual policy as rule based. That does not mean
that simple rules are any less useful or valuable.
Indeed, it may suggest that policy can be improved
by being more transparent and committed to sys-
tematic behavior.
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